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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous experimental work has demonstrated the power of the classical theory of 
economic dynamics.  In particular, the models have proved to be accurate in predicting the 
principle directions of movement and orbit-like behavior in general equilibrium systems.  
Questions left open and addressed in this study are (i) do the markets necessarily converge 
to a unique interior equilibrium or can markets exhibit the “explosive property” of 
instability and (ii) among the several variations of the classical model, which, if any, is 
most accurate in predicting what is actually observed in experiments? 
 
Markets were created and studied in the extreme environments identified by Scarf and 
Hirota.  Such environments allow us to study features of market adjustments that are 
obscured by the complexity of naturally occurring markets.  Two fundamental results are 
reported.  First, the instability phenomenon of “expanding orbits” predicted by theory does 
actually exist in the markets and exists in much the form that theory suggests.  That is, 
prices spiral outwardly around the equilibrium prices and do so in directions predicted by 
theory.  This type of disequilibrium behavior is observed for the first time in actual market 
behavior.  Thus, the principles governing market adjustment are not among those that 
guarantee convergence to a unique interior equilibrium.  Second, the best dynamic model 
from among those studied is of the form 
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where the diagonal elements are positive and the are excess demands. )(PEi
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1.  Introduction* 
 
While modern experiments have made remarkable progress toward an understanding of 
the dynamics of price and allocation changes in multiple market systems, fundamental 
questions remain.  Experimentalists have discovered that classical models, which are 
based on an assumption of tatonnement, have remarkable explanatory power even when 
applied to the non-tatonnement, continuous, double auction markets.  Such discoveries 
lead naturally to investigations of the most fundamental properties of the underlying 
models.  The experiments reported here focus on environments in which the classical 
models make rather "extreme" predictions and ask if the data reflect any of the 
substantive properties predicted.  In particular, the question posed is whether or not 
general equilibrium systems can exhibit the property of instability, as opposed to 
inevitable convergence to any equilibrium whether stable or unstable. 
 
Existing experiments in one price dimension have demonstrated that single markets can 
in fact be unstable1 but, on the other hand, experiments have also demonstrated 
underlying stabilizing forces.2  Experiments in a general equilibrium framework have 
demonstrated that the classical model can do a remarkable job of predicting the directions 
of price movement in multiple market systems.  In particular, “orbit like” behavior can be 
observed when the model predicts orbits in two-dimensional price space.3  Furthermore, 
classical models of dynamics even predict the direction of such “orbit like” behavior.  
                                                          
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged.  We thank Anjan Mukherji, Ken-Inchi 
Shimomura, Bill Zame, and Peter Bossaerts for their many helpful suggestions.   
1 The phenomenon of market instability is first observed in Plott and George (1992) for the case of a 
Marshallian externality and replicated by Plott and Smith (1999).  Instability in the case of income effects 
is first observed in Plott (2000).  
2 Carlson (1967) first notes that expectations based on past prices in a cobweb model will stabilize the price 
dynamics.  This process is observed and reported in Johnson and Plott (1989). 
3 Anderson, Plott, Shimomura, and Granat (2004). 
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However, key aspects of the dynamics remain unknown.  Existing data cannot be used to 
determine if the markets are actually traveling in a closed orbit as predicted by theory, as 
opposed to moving in slowly decreasing orbits that converge to the equilibrium or 
whether they are diverging.  Indeed, evidence exists that suggests the principles will lead 
to ultimate convergence.4  To summarize, in a broad sense the data help characterize the 
basic laws of dynamic market adjustment but fundamental and important details remain 
open.5  In this paper, we initiate a process of isolating those laws. 
 
The paper consists of eight sections and four appendices.  The next section, Section 2, 
provides some background on the structure of classical dynamic models.  The emphasis 
here is on the basic principles as opposed to the consequences of those principles.  
Interestingly enough, since experimental methods are to be employed, one is free to 
consider broad classes of principles even though important implications of those 
principles might be unknown.  Thus, while the section is brief it nevertheless attempts to 
partition deep issues of basic theory and isolate classes of models, each of which can be 
pursued in greater depth should experiments at any stage suggest the productivity of such 
investigation.  This second section suggests the logic of the investigation. 
 
Section 3 contains the detailed description of the experimental parameters, preferences, 
endowments, and market organization. An understanding of these facts is necessary for 
any understanding of what the patterns of data imply about theory.  Section 4 contains an 
application of the classical model to the experimental environment.  The competitive 
equilibrium is computed and the predicted price dynamics of the classical model are 
illustrated.  Section 5 contains the experimental procedures and the experimental design.  
The number of experiments and the conditions under which each was conducted are 
outlined in the section.  Section 6 describes a typical experiment.  The figures here help 
carry an intuition about what was observed and why the models perform as they do. 
 
Section 7 contains the results.  The process of model comparison is described and the 
sequence of conclusions that follow from the analysis are outlined.  The major 
                                                          
4 Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott (2003). 
5 A recent manuscript by Gjerstad (2004) explores a significantly different set of laws from those explored 
here.  
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conclusions are that the data move away from the competitive equilibrium, as predicted 
by the classical model, not toward it. The model that best captures the dynamics of the 
price movement and the basic law that governs the dynamics of multiple market 
adjustment contains a striking pattern of zeros and is of the form: 
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Finally, Section 8 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Background Concepts: Models of Dynamics and Classical Principles of 
Dynamic Adjustment 
 
Excellent reviews of classical dynamics are developed by McKenzie (2002) and by 
Mukherji (2002, 2003).  While much more general models can be imagined our study 
begins with theories that are special cases of the following form: 
(1) )()( PEPAP =•  
 
where P is the price vector, and A(P) is a matrix of coefficients that may depend on prices 
P, and E(P) is a vector of excess demands as a function of prices.  It should be understood 
that the theory can be very general but the experiments explored here are all in two 
dimensional prices (three commodities and thus two price ratios) so much of the notation 
in the sequel will be in two price dimensions.  From time to time, both the limited 
notation and full matrix notation will be used without confusion.  
 
The primary feature of this model is that the rates of price changes depend upon P 
through the matrix A(P) in addition to the functional relationship dictated by the fact that 
prices are in the excess demand functions.  We are unaware of any attempt to study the 
model at this level of generality so we focus on classes of special cases, although the 
literature is rich with discussion about the conditions under which less information is 
required for convergence.  See Mukherji (1995) for a summary of recent literature, and 
for a treatment of stability in three commodity (two prices) models see Mukherji (2004).  
Letting the elements of A(P) be non-constant with respect to P, two special cases can be 
found in the literature.  
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The first is based on the principle that the rate of adjustment of a given market is a linear 
function of excess demands in all markets scaled by the price that prevails in that market. 
The function A(P) becomes decomposed into a matrix that contains the prices and a 
matrix of constants which pre-multiplies the excess demand functions. 
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An alternative way of expressing this particular theory is that the percentage change in 
price depends on a constant A(P) matrix, that is, the elements of the A matrix are all 
constants, and Excess demands.  The formulas written this way are: 
(3)     )()( 2211 PEaPEa
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ii
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•
, i = 1,2 for the two-dimensional case. 
Of course, this model can be further refined by hypotheses focused on the numbers aij.   In 
particular, as will be demonstrated by our major result, the off diagonal elements might 
be zero and the diagonal elements positive.  
 
The second model is based on the Newton method of solving equations.  That is, the price 
system acts as if for small changes it is approximating the numerical process of Newton.  
Thus, the inverse of the Jacobian matrix is the integral part of the adjustment equations. 
(4)    )()( 1 PPJP Ε−= −•  
Where A(P)= 1)( −− PJ  is the inverse of the Jacobian matrix derived from the vector of  
excess demands E(P).  The central structure of models of this form are developed by 
Smale (1976), Saari (1985), and Mukherji (1995), who identify the possible need of 
(possibly all) higher order derivatives in the adjustment process to assure convergence.  
Experimental evidence for this model is presented in Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott 
(2003). 
 
A second class of models sets A(P) to be a constant matrix, independent of P.  The most 
general of such formulations in which other special cases are nested is:  
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Notice that in this model the rate of adjustment in a single market given fixed prices in all 
markets depends on the state of disequilibrium in the other markets.  That is, while 
demand might be greater than supply in one market the fact that another market is in 
disequilibrium might cause prices to go down.  Walras tended to reject this as a 
possibility and postulated a “fundamental principle” that the direction of price change in 
a given market depended only on the sign of its own excess demand. 
 
Following the intuition of Walras two special cases evolved in classical theory and are 
special cases of the equation above.  The two special cases involve diagonal matrices. 
Both of these express the importance of, if not the possibility of, partial equilibrium 
analysis in the sense that the law of supply and demand operates in markets 
independently.  According to the principles embedded in these models the adjustment in a 
market depends only on its own excess demand and not on whether other markets are in 
equilibrium or disequilibrium. Thus, adjustment in a single market can be studied 
independent of the state of equilibrium of other markets.  While prices in other markets 
might influence a given market through the excess demands, the state of disequilibrium in 
the other markets does not.  Of course, this hypothesis forms the foundation of partial 
equilibrium analysis. 
 
The only difference in the theory, which appears to be due to Samuelson’s generalization 
of Hicks, is that on the more general version the speed of adjustment need not be equal to 
excess demand and instead can be scaled from excess demand. 
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Of course, the special case that attracts attention because of its simplicity is: 
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Figure 1: Preference Parameters for the Clockwise Case 
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3.  Experimental Environment 
 
A. Preferences and Endowments 
 
The preferences employed in our experiments are similar to those studied by Scarf (1960) 
and Hirota (1981) and studied experimentally by Anderson, Plott, Shimomura, and Elbaz 
(2004), and Plott (2001), but with strategically chosen transformations.  The basic 
structure is one of perfect complements in the sense that agents have no utility for one of 
the commodities and the other two are perfect complements.  The preferences are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
In particular, the preferences and initial endowments were chosen such that in all 
experiments there existed a unique, interior competitive equilibrium.  More importantly, 
the preference parameters and initial endowments were chosen such that the classical 
model captured by equation (7) predicts that the prices will diverge from the interior 
competitive equilibrium from any non-equilibrium initial price vector, and do so in 
predictable directions.  
 
As will be discussed later, the prediction of the classical model depends importantly upon 
the preference parameters and the initial endowments.  See Appendix A for a discussion 
of the general class of models from which the experimental parameters were chosen.  In 
all experiments reported the unique, interior, competitive equilibrium is unstable 
according to the classical model.  The nature of the instability depends on the preference 
parameters and initial endowments.  Under one set of endowments, the classical model 
predicts divergence in a clockwise direction in two-dimensional price space and under a 
second set of endowments the classical model predicts divergence in a counter clockwise 
direction.  To capture this fundamental difference in predictions we have indexed 
experiments and parameter types as “Clockwise” and as “Counter Clockwise”.  The 
specific magnitudes of the utility parameters and the endowments are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  PREFERENCES AND ENDOWMENTS 
 Type 
 i = 1,2,3 
Ui(xi,yi,zi) 
(in cents) 
endowments 
ω1 = (xi,yi,zi) 
Remarks 
Clockwise 
 1 700 min{3y/40,z/800} ω1=(0,0,800) 
 2 700 min{x/20,3z/800} ω2=(20,0,0) 
 3 700 min{3x/20,y/40} ω3=(0,40,0) 
The classical model 
predicts divergence 
with tendencies in a 
clockwise direction. 
Counter Clockwise 
 1 2100 min{y/120,z/800} ω1=(0,40,0) 
 2 2100 min{x/20,z/2400} ω2=(0,0,800) 
 3 2100 min{x/60,y/40} ω3=(20,0,0) 
The classical model 
predicts divergence 
with tendencies in a 
counter clockwise 
direction. 
 
B. Market Organization 
 
The creation of the markets required many operational decisions. 
Prices of units of X and Y are quoted in the number of units of Z to be taken in exchange 
for a unit of X or Y.  That is, Z is the numeraire.  Notice that the endowments of Z are 
much greater than the endowments of the other two commodities.  This reflects the need 
for prices to be attainable as ratios of Z for the other commodity, and to do that finely 
divisible units of Z must exist.  Otherwise, the integer constraint would substantially 
reduce the number of feasible prices. 
 
Two markets exist: an X market and a Y market.  Since Z is the numeraire there is no Z 
market per se.  Thus in the X market prices are quoted in terms of the number of Z that 
will be exchanged for a unit of X and prices in the Y market are quoted in terms of the 
number of Z that will be exchanged for a unit of Y.  
 
The experiment is divided into periods of fixed time length in minutes.  At the beginning 
of each period each agent is given an endowment as indicated in Table 1.  The length of 
periods varied, with the first few periods in an experiment being longer than those later.  
This procedure is often employed in complex experiments because traders require time to 
learn about the trading technology, sources of information, etc. but after such skills have 
been acquired the periods can be shortened. 
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The markets were conducted through an electronic market place developed by the 
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science, (EEPS), called 
Marketscape. This market platform supports multiple, simultaneous, continuous markets.  
The markets had open (public) books in which bids and asks are placed if they are not at 
levels that would automatically trigger a trade by meeting the conditions of some 
previous bid or ask.  The bids are exposed to the market from highest price to lowest, 
while asks are exposed from lowest to highest.  Bids and asks remain in the book 
throughout a period unless expired, cancelled, or executed in a trade. In addition all data 
from all trades are available for viewing in continuous time through both a periodically 
updated graph and from a listing of data of all trades.  All traders had access to these data 
throughout the experiment. 
 
When a trade took place, the transaction was immediately recorded and units of inventory 
and money were transferred between trading parties.  It is important to note that this 
continuous, double auction institution means that trading will take place at disequilibrium 
prices.  Multiple prices will exist over a period.  This feature will become clear and 
important when viewing market data generated in the experiments.  This institution 
embodies the essence of a non-tatonnement mechanism and is thus much different from 
classical descriptions in which all trades take place at the same price and that price is an 
equilibrium price.  There is no “Walrasian auctioneer” in these markets; they are totally 
decentralized. 
 
Experimental considerations, and in particular the potential earnings of subjects, required 
the imposition of minimum price floors.  Notice from the parameters in Table 1 that if the 
allocation approaches a boundary, with one of the prices equal to zero, then the agent 
with endowment of that commodity would have zero income from the experiment.  The 
consequent potential loss of experimental control suggested that price floors be 
implemented. The prices of neither X nor Y could go below five Z.  Thus, in the markets 
prices are bounded away from zero but so long as prices are on the interior there are no 
operating constraints on what they might be. 
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4.  Competitive Model and Classical Dynamics 
 
Application of the competitive model produces the excess demand equations found in 
Table 2. Individual demand functions are computed under the hypothesis that the agent 
takes the quoted price as given and then chooses quantities subject to the implied budget 
constraint and initial endowments. The individual demand functions are then summed 
and the total of initial endowments subtracted to get the excess demand functions.  
Equilibrium is computed by simultaneously setting all excess demand functions equal to 
zero as reflected in the principle that at equilibrium, market demand equals market 
supply.  For economies with one of each type of agent the excess demand functions are 
stated in Table 2.  
Table 2:  EXCESS DEMAND EQUATIONS 
 EX PX ,PY( ) EY PX ,PY( ) EZ PX ,PY( ) 
Clockwise 60PX
40 + 3PX
+ 40PY
PX + 6PY
− 20 800
60 + PY
+ 240PY
PX + 6PY
− 40 800 PX
40 + 3PX
+ 60
60 + PY
−1⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
Counter 
Clockwise 
800
120 + PX
+ 60PX
3PX + 2PY
− 20  40 PX
3PX + 2PY
+ 3PY
20 + 3PY
−1⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 800
120
120 + PX
+ PY
20 + 3PY
−1⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
 
Of course the competitive equilibrium is defined as the prices and quantities for which 
excess demands equal zero. Thus, by setting to zero the equations in Table 2 and solving, 
we find the competitive equilibrium for both sets of parameters.  The solutions for both 
the set of clockwise parameters and the set of counter clockwise parameters are given in 
Table 3.  There the equilibrium prices, quantities, and incomes for both sets of parameters 
are stated.  The scalar transforms the numbers into cents that subjects received.  
 
Table 3:  COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA  
 Type 
 i = 1,2,3 
Incomes 
(times a 
scalar) 
Final 
allocations 
(xi,yi,zi) 
Prices 
Clockwise 
 1 .75 (700) (0, 10,600) 
 2 .75 (700) (15,0,200) 
 3 .75 (700) (5,30,0) 
( 40, 20, 1  ) 
Counter Clockwise 
 1 .25 (2100) (0,30,200) 
 2 .25 (2100) (5,0,600) 
 3 .25 (2100) (15,10,0) 
( 40, 20, 1  ) 
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Much of the design is driven by the predictions of the classical models of dynamics 
represented by the system of equations (7).  Shown in Figure 2A and Figure 2B are the 
phase diagrams resulting from (7) for the parameters given in Table 3.  These diagrams  
 
show the pairs P = (PX ,PY ) for which the excess demand are zero for commodity X and 
commodity Y respectively.  That is, the curve EX (P) = 0 in Figure 2A for example, is the 
pairs of prices for which the excess demand of X is zero in the clockwise parameter case, 
and curve EY (P) = 0 shows the pairs of prices for which the excess demand for Y is zero. 
These curves divide the space into regions for which the excess demand for X is positive 
(negative) so price pressure on X is up (down) according to theory.  And the space is also 
divided with respect to areas in which the excess demand for Y is positive (negative) so 
the price pressure on Y is up (down) according to the theory.  These regions thus indicate 
the direction of movements of price pairs as predicted by the theory over the course of the 
experiment.  These predictions of price change directions are shown by the small arrows. 
The dashed line is a simulated path. 
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Figure 2A Clockwise Parameters 
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Figure 2B contains a similar illustration for the Counter Clockwise parameters.  Notice 
that the position and shapes of the curves are different.  More importantly, the resulting 
dynamics predicted by this model are different.  In the clockwise case, the prediction is 
for the prices to move in a clockwise direction in (Px, Py) space, and in the counter 
clockwise case, the predicted directions of movement is the opposite. 
 
The unique interior equilibrium of this model is shown by the center dot.  In both cases, 
the two equations are simultaneously satisfied at the point Pe = (40,20).  It is the 
competitive equilibrium.  It is the unique interior point at which both markets are in 
equilibrium simultaneously.  This equilibrium point is predicted by all models.  However, 
the exact dynamics, the paths in relationship to the equilibrium, differs from model to 
model.  
 
Notice that the dynamics pushes price toward the origin, (0,0).  That is the case for both 
the clockwise and counter clockwise parameters.  For several experiments, small price 
floors were imposed to prevent outcomes where subject earnings could be zero.  When 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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PY 
EY (P) = 0
EX (P) = 0
Figure 2B Counter Clockwise Parameters 
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the price floor existed, the pair of minimum prices create a stationery “sink” from which 
prices cannot move.  Without the floors the constraint that prices could not be negative 
created a point at (0,0) from which the only possible movement is along an appropriate 
axis. 
 
5.  Procedures and Experimental Design 
  
Six separate experiments were conducted, all at the California Institute of Technology in 
the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science (EEPS) between 
November 2002 and July 2003.  The continuous time double auction multiple markets 
were implemented using Marketscape as described in the sections above.  Each 
experiment consisted of a number of subjects modulo 3, as we require that there be an 
equal number of subjects of each type.  The actual number of subjects in the experiments 
ranged from 9 to 18.  Participants included Caltech undergraduate and graduate students, 
as well students from Pasadena City College, many of whom were familiar with the 
software from previous (unrelated) experiments, but who did not necessarily have any 
training in economics. 
 
Types were assigned sequentially to subjects as they logged into the software, and the 
order in which this occurred was essentially random.  Subject payments averaged about 
$40.00 per subject per experiment.  Experiments lasted no more than three hours.  Upon 
arrival in the laboratory, subjects were given written instructions; including both a 
numeric table and a graphical display of indifference curves that represented their 
induced preferences.  In addition, we included an unrelated payoff table that was used to 
illustrate how to read their true payoff table (which differed across subjects). 
 
Each experiment began with a practice trading period which served several purposes.  It 
allowed subjects to become acquainted with the computers and software, so that they 
were comfortable with how to execute bid and ask offers before the paid portion of the 
experiment began.  It also allowed time for the subjects to study their payoff information. 
In order to implement an initial price, we requested that all trades in the practice period 
-14- 
take place at a price of 25z.6  This essentially provided a focal point for prices at the 
beginning of the first actual period, and worked effectively to control the initial 
conditions.  That is, prices in the experiments tended to start at (25,25). 
 
Following the practice period, each experiment consisted of a number of trading periods, 
ranging from 10 to 14 periods per session.  Each period, in turn, lasted between 8 and 18 
minutes.  At the end of each period, subjects were paid in experimental currency (francs) 
computed from the final holdings via the utility function.  Then all inventories were 
cleared, and endowments were reset to their original values before the start of the 
subsequent period.  To avoid any “last period” effects, the final period was not 
announced as such until after it had concluded.  After the close of the final period, 
earnings in francs were tallied and converted to dollars via a conversion factor.  Subjects 
were then either paid in cash before they left the laboratory, or else checks were mailed to 
them shortly thereafter. 
 
Two primary treatments were used in the experimental design: clockwise (C) and 
counterclockwise (CC).  The utility functions and endowments of each type of agent for 
the two treatments are given above.  The following Table summarizes our experimental 
design. 
 
TABLE 4:  Experimental Design 
Treatment Date Periods Interior 
Periods* 
N Experienced 
Included 
I. Clockwise 11/27/2002 10 1-4 18 No 
 12/11/2002 14 1-12 12 No 
 7/17/2003 11 1-6 18 Yes 
II. Counterclockwise 1/30/2003 12 2-7 15 Yes 
 4/28/2003 9 3-6 15 Yes 
 6/20/2003 19 8-16 9 Yes 
*Periods in which price pairs (PX ,PY )  are away from the boundary of the price space 
 
6.   An Illustration of the Market Behavior 
 
Figures 3A and 3B are included here to preview the patterns of results.  These figures 
also motivate how the data are treated for estimation purposes. 
                                                          
6 We did not do this in the first session, experiment 021127. 
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Figure 3A contains all transactions in both markets displayed as a time series.  The 
variability of individual transactions is clear from the figure.  Notice that the transactions 
in different markets take place at different times meaning that at any moment in time 
there is no “price pair” in the sense required by the models.  Thus, prices at an instant in 
time as required by the dynamic models must be computed from some intermediate 
model or statistical model.  Our choice is to define prices as the mean price over each 10-
trade block.  For tests that are robust to such asynchrony, such as the distance measure 
discussed and used in the next section, we use the original, unaveraged data.  
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Figure 3A Transaction Price Time Series: Experiment 030130 
 
 
There is also the issue concerning which concept of time to use.  Should time be 
incremented according to the clock time of each trade, or should some other measure of 
time be used?  We used the ordinal measure of time that is updated after each trade in 
either market.  However, for some purposes, time is updated only after a trade in “own” 
market. 
 
Because of the exploding cycles in price space produced by the experiment, prices 
inevitably move near the boundaries of the price space.  This causes a number of 
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problems.  For example, the potential lack of income if prices are zero may cause 
subjects to lose interest in the experiment.  For this reason the price floors were 
introduced.  But the price floors, and boundaries in general, create data processing 
problems.  At the extreme, when prices are at the boundary, prices are no longer allowed 
to adjust in the direction of the boundary.  More generally, near the boundary, the error 
term becomes one-sided and the normality assumption is violated due to the boundary.  
In the results below, we censored trades where prices are near the boundary of the price 
space.  Again, for tests that are robust to this constraint, such as the clockhand model, we 
use the full, uncensored data.  
 
The cyclical movement of prices is evident in the individual transactions data but other 
patterns are also worthy of note.  In particular, prices seem to show “no movement” for 
long periods of time, followed by sudden movements.  This type of property is not 
predicted by any of the models because it has the property that when the model system is 
in greatest disequilibrium no movement takes place but when movement starts, and the 
level of disequilibrium is reduced, the movement speeds.  Thus, this feature of the data 
can induce model error even when the model captures many of the other features of the 
movement. 
 
Figure 3B illustrates the movement of average prices in a period in relation to the phase 
diagram and the predicted dynamics of the classical model.  As can be seen, the general 
pattern movement is consistent with the classical model.  In neither figure does the 
movement appear to be toward the equilibrium.  Furthermore, the general directions of 
the movement are those predicted by the model. 
 
In the next section, the impressions of these two figures are demonstrated statistically.  
However, the classical model will not be the most accurate from a rigorous point of view.  
Close examination of Figure 3B contains hints of problems.  Notice that when the prices 
begin to move the movement is down and to the right as predicted.  But then in period, 
three there is a slight upward movement in the price of Y and then, in the following 
period there is a jump of phase.  Continuing to follow the time series in the figure, notice 
that the price of Y turns down when the model suggests that it should still go up.  Thus, 
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many subtle patterns exist in these data, some of which are captured more completely by 
an alternative to the classical model. 
Figure 3B Average Period Prices and Phase Diagram: Experiment 030130  
 
7.  Results 
 
An impression of the market behavior that leads to the results is gained from Figure 4.  
Shown there is the time series of average prior price for all periods of all experiments.  
The average price of X is on the horizontal axis and the average price of Y is the vertical 
axis.  The upper panel contains all (theoretically) clockwise experiments and the 
counterclockwise are all the lower.  As can be seen, the movements are in the general 
direction predicted by theory.  Indeed, an understanding of all of the major results can be 
gained from this figure. 
 
The first two results address the problem that motivated the experiments.  Is it the case 
that the markets necessarily converge toward the interior competitive equilibrium?  The 
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answer given by the data is “no”.  The movement of the markets is not in the direction of 
the competitive equilibrium and instead exhibit properties of movement away from the 
interior competitive equilibrium (Result 1), and do so in directions consistent with the 
prediction of the classical model (Result 2).   
 
With the initial questions answered the analysis moves to consider specific models of the 
dynamic principles that might be at work.  The first test (Result 3) is the classical model 
nested in equations such as (5).  While the model receives considerable support, the data 
exhibit several rather clear inconsistencies with this model suggesting that variations of 
the model might improve its success.  The next two results (Result 4 and Result 5) reflect 
our attempts to isolate where the improvements might reside by having the dynamics 
depending on prices as in equations (1) and (2).  Result 6 demonstrates that the price 
adjusted models in the form of equation (2) appear to be the best for explaining what we 
observe.  
Figure 4. Average Period Prices All Experiments: 
Clockwise Parameters Upper Panel and Counterclockwise Parameters Lower Panel 
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The initial questions related to the directions of movement of prices.  Are the prices 
moving, perhaps slowly, in the direction of the interior equilibrium and are they doing so 
by moving in the directions predicted by the classical model.  The next two results 
address those questions.  Result 1 demonstrates that the movements are away from the 
equilibrium price.  Result 2 demonstrates that the directions of the movements, clockwise 
or counter clockwise, are as predicted by the classical model. 
 
Result 1.  Prices diverge from the interior equilibrium.  That is, over time the prices 
move further away from the equilibrium price pair in Euclidean price space. 
Support.    
The question was investigated by regressing distance from the equilibrium on time.  
Distance was measured as the Euclidean distance of pair of prices P = PX ,PY( ) and the 
equilibrium Pe = (40,20) .  A positive coefficient on time suggests that prices are moving 
away from equilibrium in the X-Y price space.   
Because of the bias introduced to the distance metric at the boundaries, however, we 
censored the data when prices move near the boundary of the price space.  The periods 
used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.  
 
Figure 5: Distance from equilibrium separated by session. 
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Figure 5 presents such scatter plots for each session.  The vertical axis shows the distance 
of the price from the equilibrium price and the horizontal axis represents the order of the 
trade.  The figures carry the suggestion that as the volume of trades increases over time 
the prices get further away from the equilibrium price.  Table 5 shows the estimates from 
the regression.  The regressions make precise the impressions from the figures.  The 
regression is a fixed effects model in which a common slope is assumed for each session, 
whereas the intercept is allowed to vary from session-to-session.7  The estimates show 
that prices are moving away from the equilibrium on average.  The movement away from 
the equilibrium price is on average 0.568 with each trade and highly significant.   
Table 5:  Regression of distance on time. 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -19.78881 4.60104 -4.301 1.83E-05 
Trade.Time 0.56764 0.01999 28.392 < 2e-16 
021211 35.73516 5.4225 6.59 6.43E-11 
030130 16.97038 6.15592 2.757 0.005922 
030428 193.17394 6.93367 27.86 < 2e-16 
030620 28.16805 7.56971 3.721 0.000207 
030717 12.66667 5.42042 2.337 0.019603 
 
To confirm that this result is not an artifact of the censoring, we conducted a paired t-test 
on the beginning and end prices (uncensored time series) of the market over the 6 
sessions.  The test asks if the beginning prices are closer to the equilibrium prices than 
are the ending prices.  For the 6 pairs of prices, the mean distance was 18.01 (in units of 
Z) at the beginning of the experiment, and 36.89 at the end (t = 5.59).  The test is 
significant at p = 1.26e-3 for a one-tailed test. 
 
Result 2. The directions of price movements are consistent with the classical dynamics 
model. 
 
Support. 
In a sense, a brief glance at the time series in Figure 3B suggests an answer to the 
question and Figure 6 provides a more complete view.  We apply two nonparametric 
                                                          
7  A mixed effects models also show that the coefficient on the interaction term “Trade.Time” is significant.  
Individual session regressions show that all sessions have positive and significant sign on Trade.Time, 
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tests: (1) a “clockhand” model, and (2) a “sign test”.  The “clockhand” test simply 
measures the angle in price space between where the data started relative to the 
equilibrium (with the equilibrium centered on (0,0) and where the prices are at any 
instant of time.  A line segment connects the data point with the equilibrium and as the 
data moves the line segment rotates around the equilibrium.  The model measures the 
angle between the original line segment and the line segment that connects the 
equilibrium to the data at any point in time.  (See Anderson, et. al., for a geometric 
description).  
 
Because the clockhand test is a non-parametric test that is robust to both boundary 
restrictions and asynchronous trades, we are able to use the entire time-series for all the 
sessions.   
 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative angle changes in all 6 sessions.  There is a clear separation 
between the clockwise and counter-clockwise treatments.  In addition, note that 2 of the 
counterclockwise treatments resulted in cumulative angle changes greater than 2π .  I.e., 
in two of the sessions, the price orbit completed a complete cycle.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Clockhand model.  Note that there is a clear separation between the 
clockwise and counterclockwise treatments, in accordance to theory. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
except for session 021127.  That session was the only session where prices did not begin near (25,25), and 
proceeded to crash almost immediately to Py ~ 0.   
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The sign test is a binomial test with p=1/4 that counts the instances where the sign of the 
price change in a given trade matches the sign of the excess demand in both markets.  
That is, whether sign(PX ,t − PX ,t−1,PY ,t − PY ,t−1) = sign(EX (Pt−1),EY (Pt−1)). 
 
This test is sensitive to both boundary effects and asynchronous trades; therefore the 
censored and averaged data was used.  Pooling over all sessions, there were a total of 124 
data points, of which in 52 trials the price change was predicted correctly by excess 
demand in both the X and Y markets.  Compared to a random prediction, the test was 
significant at a p = 4.112e-5. 
 
In a sense both Result 1 and Result 2 are implicitly answered by Result 3, which suggests 
that the classical model has considerable explanatory power.  Result 3 makes that clear 
while simultaneously listing inaccuracies of the model that motivate a deeper 
investigation of the dynamics.  The classical model (equation (6)) is nested in the more 
general system of equations (5).  Since all prices and allocations are observable to the 
experimenter, so are the price changes and the excess demands as defined by the 
competitive model.  That allows us to directly estimate the parameters of the dynamic 
models and examine the structure of the error terms. 
 
Several operational assumptions were made as were outlined in the section above.  All 
econometric models were estimated in OLS and mixed effects8.  The results are generally 
similar, with the few differences we shall discuss.  
 
In order to estimate the classical model given the experiments data, we will replace (5) 
with a set of stochastic difference equations for transaction price changes  
 
.)( 11 ++ ++=− tttt PAEaPP ε  
 
The noise term 1+tε  is assumed to be mean zero and uncorrelated with past information 
(order flow, transaction volume, and prices). 
 
Equivalently, we can write the above as (8). 
                                                          
8 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) was also performed.  The results were nearly identical to the OLS 
equations—suggesting that disturbances between the markets are not correlated. 
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(8)        )()( PEaPEaaP YXYXXXsessionx ++=
•
 
           )()( PEaPEaaP YYYXYXsessionY ++=
•
 
Clearly, the classical model is nested in the estimated equations.  That is, the classical 
model holds that the intercept term should be zero and the diagonal elements positive.  
The off diagonal elements should be zero.   
 
RESULT 3: The Classical Model receives substantial support but has challenging 
inconsistencies with the data. 
 
Support 
The support and analysis involves several different types of arguments. The first analysis 
comes from the estimates of the elements of the A matrix from equation (5) and 
equations (8) These results are described as (i) below. Two properties are of interest here. 
The first are the signs of the diagonal elements and the second, included as (ii) below, are 
the off diagonal elements. As shown in the support the diagonal elements have the 
predicted property (both positive) but the off diagonal elements do not, and so are 
investigated further under (ii). To ensure that our estimates are sensible, we ran further 
analysis to see if they matched qualitatively with our data.  First, the eigenvalues of the 
differential equations we estimate from the data around the equilibrium can be used to 
check the convergence or divergence properties of the system. The eigenvalues also 
suggest a difficulty for the model as described in (iii), which lead to a more detailed 
investigation through simulation of the estimated model. These results are presented in 
(iv) along with the phase diagrams, which give a better view of the overall properties 
(and not just the local properties as given by the eigenvalues).  Simulated paths from 
various initial values are also included in the section, which concludes with a list of 
properties found in the data that differ from those predicted by the model.   
 
(i) Estimates of A matrix coefficients and diagonal elements. 
 
We estimated separately the equations for the X and Y markets and include the estimates 
as Table 6A and Table 6B9. 
                                                          
9 As was discussed above, because of issues arising from trade asynchrony and price boundaries, we use the 
censored and averaged time series data.  
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Table 6A:  ),(),( YXYXYYXXXXsessionx PPEaPPEaaP ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -1.4283 1.6154 -0.884 0.37843
Ex(P) 0.8697 0.2557 3.401 0.00092
EY(P) -0.1101 0.1036 -1.063 0.29008
021211 2.788 1.9403 1.437 0.15343
030130 2.2848 2.2488 1.016 0.31173
030428 4.9783 2.4477 2.034 0.04425
030620 0.2193 2.6946 0.081 0.93528
030717 2.8355 1.9617 1.445 0.15103
Residual standard error: 5.837 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.1578, Adjusted R-squared: 0.107  
F-statistic: 3.104 on 7 and 116 DF, p-value: 0.004882  
 
Table 6B: ),(),( YXYYYYXXYXsessiony PPEaPPEaaP ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 1.63893 1.14411 1.432 0.15469
Ex(P) -0.49751 0.1811 -2.747 0.00697
EY(P) 0.20218 0.07338 2.755 0.00681
021211 -0.70852 1.37422 -0.516 0.60713
030130 -1.07071 1.59272 -0.672 0.50276
030428 3.7733 1.73365 2.177 0.03154
030620 -0.77622 1.90849 -0.407 0.68496
030717 -1.45572 1.38941 -1.048 0.29694
Residual standard error: 4.134 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2572, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2123  
F-statistic: 5.737 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 1.024e-05  
 
 
On the face of it, the classical model appears to predict well.  Results from Table 6A and 
Table 6B show that the markets move in the direction of their own excess demand.  That 
is, the classical prediction that aXX and aYY > 0 are both properties of the adjustment 
process.  The direction of divergence is also consistent with those observed in the data. 
Notice also that the intercept term is not different from zero, as it should be according to 
the classical model.  Several anomalies, however, suggest that the explanatory power of 
the classical model can be improved upon.  
 
(ii) Off- diagonal property tests 
First, the asymmetry of the A matrix is puzzling.  Whereas both diagonal elements of the 
A matrix are positive and significant, only one of the off-diagonal elements is significant.  
-25- 
It is furthermore larger than the AYY coefficient, which would suggest that price changes 
in the Y market respond proportionally more to the excess demand in the X market rather 
than the Y market, which is perplexing. 
 
(iii) Eigenvalues  
For the counterclockwise condition, the eigenvalues around the equilibrium (Px, Py) = 
(40,20) are (0.170065, 0.0193102), which are both positive real roots.  This implies that 
the path of differential equation simply diverges, but does not diverge cyclically as 
predicted. 
 
For the clockwise case, the eigenvalues are the complex roots ( 0.0471+0.0325 i , 0.0471 
- 0.0325 i ).  This implies that the path of differential equations cyclically diverges as 
predicted.   
 
(iv) Phase Diagrams and Simulation 
The phase diagrams and simulation suggest the nature of the problems with the model. 
The dynamics themselves have room for improvement. Calculation of the phase diagram 
using the coefficients measured econometrically shows that the phase diagram of the 
system does not capture the behavior of the experimental data.  The phase diagrams from 
measured coefficients are in Figure 7A and 8B.  
 
Finally, a simulation confirms the behavior of the estimate of the classical system. The 
simulations are contained in Figure 8A and Figure 8B.  These dynamics are clearly 
contradicted by our data in both treatments. 
 
RESULT 4.  Price changes are influenced by prices directly in addition to the 
dependence through the excess demand functions. 
 
Support. 
The table of estimates of a model that has the adjustment linear in prices is included as 
Appendix B.  The price coefficients are positive suggesting that the price variables pick 
up some, possibly nonlinear movement.  This finding motivated a more serious 
examination of models in which the adjustment matrix contained prices. The next results 
followed from that examination. 
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Theory suggests two ways in which prices might enter the adjustment process while 
preserving the general theory of the dynamics.  The first is captured by the system of 
equations (4).  It is the theory that the adjustment matrix is the inverse of the Jacobian 
matrix of the excess demand functions.  Since the theoretical excess demand functions 
are known to us we can impose the equations directly on the measurements.  The 
questions lead to estimation of the equations: 
(9) ),()),((),()),(( 11 YXYYXXYXYYXXYXXXXXsessionX PPEPPJaPPZPPJaaP −−
• −+−+=  
           
),()),((),()),(( 11 YXYYXYYYYYXXYXXXYXsessionY PPEPPJaPPZPPJaaP
−−• −+−+=  
 
As is clear from the next result the theory that the markets follow the Newton method of 
dynamic solutions to equations is substantially rejected by the data. 
 
Figure 7A: Phase diagram for the 
Clockwise Treatment 
 
Figure 7B: Phase diagram for the 
Counterclockwise Treatment 
 
Figure 8A Simulation of the Clockwise 
treatment with initial prices (40,30), 
(30,40), and (80,50). 
 
Figure 8B : Simulation of the 
Counterclockwise treatment with initial 
prices (24,16), (43,20), (50,30), and 
(60,22). 
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RESULT 5.  Neither the Newton nor Generalized Newton model produce explanatory 
improvements over the classical model. 
Support. 
Equations (9) were estimated following the procedures employed elsewhere when dealing 
with the data.  Table 7A and Table 7B show the estimates for the Newton model.  Notice 
that the model does not fit the data well. The only coefficient that is significant is the 
dummy on Session 030428, which has an outlier (also reflected in the A matrix 
estimates).  Essentially, we find no support for the Newton model.  The Global Newton 
model produces similar estimation results as the Newton model.  
 
That the Newton method and its relatives do not fit the data reflects the fact these models 
all predict convergent behavior in the price space that is not observed in our data.  (See 
Appendix C.) 
 
Table 7A: 
),()),((),()),(( 11 YXYYXXYXYYXXYXXXXXsessionx PPEPPJaPPEPPJaaP
−−• −+−+=  
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -0.171909 1.3836516 -0.124 0.901
)())(( 1 PEPJ XXX
−−  0.0008175 0.0006682 1.224 0.224
)())(( 1 PEPJ yXX
−−  0.0005572 0.0007719 -0.722 0.472
021211 1.7212789 1.7195688 1.001 0.319
030130 0.0833624 2.0192343 0.041 0.967
030428 3.8098075 2.3057904 1.652 0.101
030620 -0.477877 2.5509733 -0.187 0.852
030717 1.9256433 1.7269667 1.115 0.267
Residual standard error: 6.029 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.1015, Adjusted R-squared: 0.04733  
F-statistic: 1.873 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 0.08017  
Table 7B: )())(()())(( 11 PEPJaPEPJaaP YYYYYXyXYXsessiony
−−• −+−+=  
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -3.35E-01 1.01E+00 -0.332 0.740721
)())(( 1 PEPJ XYX
−−  1.01E-05 9.18E-05 1.101 0.27327
)())(( 1 PEPJ yYY
−−  -1.65E-04 3.83E-04 -0.431 0.667493
021211 1.52E+00 1.28E+00 1.192 0.235751
030130 1.80E+00 1.47E+00 1.223 0.223785
030428 5.97E+00 1.67E+00 3.579 0.000505
030520 1.08E+11 1.86E+00 0.583 0.560907
030717 4.63E-01 1.26E+00 0.367 0.714282
-28- 
Residual standard error: 4.404 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.157, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1061  
F-statistic: 3.086 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 0.0051  
 
The analysis above left us with still one more unexplored path suggested by the data, and 
that is a model in which the dynamics operate on the percentage change in prices as 
opposed to the changes in prices directly.  That is, if prices are low it takes a greater 
difference in excess demand to generate a certain absolute price change than if prices are 
high.  That dynamics of the theory are captured by the system of equations (2) or as 
found in estimated form, equations (3).  For purposes of estimation the equations are: 
(10)       )()( PEPaPEPaaP YXXYXXXXsessionx ++=
•
 
           )()( PEPaPEPaaP YYYYXYYXsessionY ++=
•
 
 
RESULT 6.  The Scaled Classical Model has good accuracy and does not have the 
inaccuracies of the other models. 
    (i)    the R2 measures are good relative to other models 
   (ii)    the estimated A matrix is a diagonal matrix 
  (iii)   eigenvalue analysis is consistent with observations 
  (iv)    phase diagrams and simulations are consistent with observed price movements.  
   (v)   directions of price movements are consistent with the model. 
 
Support. 
Table 8A and 8B presents the regression results from the scaled classical model.  For 
additional analysis of individual sessions, see Appendix D.  The elements of the result are 
addressed in order. Basically, the fit of the model is good and, more importantly, the 
scaled price model solves all of the aforementioned anomalies observed in the classical 
model as detailed in the parts of the statement of the result.  
 
(i)  It is clear through the R2 that the scaled price model fits much better than the classical 
model.10  An F-test of a full model including both excess demand and price scaled excess 
demand does not reject the reduced model with price-scaled excess demand only (X 
                                                          
10  Durbin-Watson tests for serial correlation of the residuals do not reject the null hypothesis 
( -0.198=Xρ , p=0.108, two sided; ρY = −0.007 , p=0.596, two sided). 
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market: F = 1.9404, DF=2, p < 0.2, Y market: F = 1.9679, DF=2, p<0.2).  A Cox-test for 
non-nested models shows similar results. 
 
(ii) The estimates conform to the predictions of the model.  The adjustment matrix is 
symmetric, with positive diagonals and negative but insignificant off-diagonals.   
Table 8A: )()( PEPaPEPaaP YXXYXXXXsessionx ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -91.4E-01 1.66E+00 -0.55 0.5833
)(PEP XX  1.48E-02 2.96E-03 5.167 1.00E-06
)(PEP YY  -5.33E-04 5.57E-04 -0.957 0.3408
021211 1.46E-01 2.12E+00 0.069 0.9451
030130 1.88E+00 2.35E+00 0.802 0.4244
030428 5.65E+00 2.34E+00 2.413 0.0174
030620 -4.16E-01 2.84E+00 -0.146 0.8839
030717 -1.10E-01 2.18E+00 -0051 0.9596
Residual standard error: 20.81 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2963, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2538  
F-statistic: 6.977 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 6.188e-07  
 
Table 8B: )()( PEPaPEPaaP YYYYXYYXsessiony ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 7.42E-01 1.43E+00 0.517 0.606
)(PEP YX  -1.43E-03 1.42E-03 -1.007 0.316
)(PEP YX  1.09E-02 1.73E-03 6.336 4.64E-09
021211 -5.42E-01 1.70E+00 -0.319 0.75
030130 -2.05E+00 1.97E+00 -1.039 0.301
030428 3.33E+00 2.19E+00 1.522 0.131
030620 -1.53E+00 2.44E+00 -0.628 0.531
030717 -1.70E+00 1.65E+00 -1.03 0.305
Residual standard error: 12.28 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.4088, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3731  
F-statistic: 11.46 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 5.433e-11  
 
(iii) Eigenvalues 
 
The eigenvalues in counterclockwise are ( 0.0477 + 0.0351 i , 0.0477 - 0.0351 i ). 
 
The eigenvalues in clockwise are ( 0.0023 + 0.0018 i , 0.0023 - 0.0018 i ). 
 
Therefore, the paths have the cyclically diverging property displayed in the data.  This 
property is suggested by the phase diagrams, discussed next. 
 
(iv) Phase Diagrams and simulations 
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Phase diagrams calculated using estimates in the scaled price model show that they are 
remarkably similar to those of the classical model with identity adjustment A matrix. The 
phase diagrams from the estimated matrix are shown if Figure 9A and Figure 9B. 
 
Finally, simulations of price paths given the estimated equations and various initial 
conditions show cyclical behavior broadly consistent with observed data.  These are 
shown in Figure 10A and 10B. 
 
(v) Direction of Price Movements 
The simulations demonstrate that the predicted price movements are in the clockwise and 
counter clockwise direction, much the same as the classical model.  Result 2 
demonstrated that the actual price movements were in the predicted direction.  Thus, the 
price movements are in the direction predicted by the model and the prices do diverge 
from the equilibrium as predicted by the model. 
 
Figure 9A: Phase Diagram for the 
Clockwise Treatment 
 
Figure 9B: Phase Diagram for the 
Counterclockwise Treatment  
 
Figure 10A: Simulation of Clockwise 
Treatment with initial prices (40,30, 30,40, 
and (80,50). 
 
Figure 10B: Simulation of 
Counterclockwise Treatment with initial 
prices (24,16), (43,20), (50,30), (60,22). 
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One final issue needs to be addressed.  We can see from the above results that the 
classical model with price-scaled price changes works well to predict the paths.  Yet, the 
model is based upon a tatonnement story while the actual data are produced by a non-
tatonnement process.  Can we proceed with a theory founded on tatonnement when we 
know that the theory will be applied to a non tatonnement world?  The results seem to 
suggest so and the questions that naturally surfaces are why that might be the case and 
what are the limitations.  The next result takes a step toward a resolution of the puzzle.  
For the environment we study, the answer is that the predictions of the two models are 
virtually the same. 
 
RESULT 7.  The predictions of a tatonnement model and a non-tatonnement model are 
very similar in these environments. 
 
Support. 
We estimate a model in which price adjusts proportional to the scaled instantaneous 
excess demand (IED).  IED is defined as the excess demand function evaluated at the 
prices at time t and allocations of all agents at time t i.e., E(Pt , xt ), where 
  xt = (x1, x2,K, xn ).  Tables 9A and 9B present regression results from the above model.  
Table 9A: ),(),( ,,, ttYtXXYttXtXXXsessiontX xPEPaxPEPaaP ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -1.3068231 1.5568398 -0.839 0.403 
021211 0.6516592 1.9859814 0.328 0.743 
030130 1.8842574 2.1967005 0.858 0.393 
030428 2.3615645 2.1886043 1.079 0.283 
030620 -0.3443601 2.6777363 -0.129 0.898 
030717 1.0030917 2.0247707 0.495 0.621 
),(, ttXtX xPEP  0.0161753 0.0030177 5.36 4.29E-07 
),(, ttYtX xPEP  -0.0005254 0.0005617 -0.935 0.352 
Residual standard error: 19.68 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.3706, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3326  
F-statistic: 9.758 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 1.623e-09  
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Table 9B: ),(),( ,, ttYtYYYttXtYYXsession xPEPaxPEPaaP ++=
•
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.528986 1.433484 0.369 0.7128 
021211 -0.955177 1.700771 -0.562 0.5755 
030130 -1.937615 1.969266 -0.984 0.3272 
030428 4.817582 2.127789 2.264 0.0254 
030620 -1.221629 2.436275 -0.501 0.617 
030717 -2.128055 1.660322 -1.282 0.2025 
),(, ttXtY xPEP  -0.002276 0.001996 -1.14 0.2566 
),(, ttYtY xPEP  0.010594 0.001959 5.408 3.47E-07 
Residual standard error: 12.29 on 116 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.4073, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3715  
F-statistic: 11.39 on 7 and 116 DF,  p-value: 6.241e-11  
 
Compared to the estimates of tatonnement in Table 6A and 6B, the IED estimates are 
qualitatively similar.  Diagonal elements aXX  and aYY  are both positive and significant, 
but only one of the off-diagonal elements, aYX  is significant.  In addition, the confidence 
intervals of the estimated coefficients in the two models overlap. 
 
Figure 11 shows the reason behind this.  Namely, the excess demand of tatonnement and 
that of IED are nearly identical.  The similarity of the regressions follow as a result.  
 
Figure 11: Scatter plot of excess demand evaluated at the endowment and excess 
demand evaluated at the allocations at time t.  
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The final result, Result 7, goes to a very deep issue in general equilibrium theory and its 
applications. For the most part, non-tatonnement theory has not been used in applications 
because the data that are required in order to adjust the model for disequilibrium trades 
are seldom available in field examples.  Thus, the question becomes whether or not a 
model based on tatonnement is reliable when it is applied to a non-tatonnement 
environment.  Result 7 says that the predictions of the two models can be very close and 
this is because the excess demand functions are very close.  Of course, exactly why they 
are close in the experiments is an open question11 but to the extent that this property 
survives in the field, the theory can proceed with some confidence that it will not be 
substantially misleading about what is observed. 
 
 
8.  Summary of Conclusions 
 
The experiments permitted the study the properties of market dynamics typically 
unobservable in markets found in the field.  Left to her own nature does not cooperate to 
create environments required to separate complex theories.  The Scarf environment 
accomplishes that task.  
 
The conclusions are easy to summarize.  Prices appear to adjust according to the classical 
model of dynamics with the following modifications. First, markets adjust at different 
speeds, so while the adjustment matrix is diagonal, the diagonal elements are not equal.  
Secondly, the diagonal elements are weighted by the prices.  This means that the 
percentage change in price seems to follow a clear set of principles while the absolute 
changes in prices are more difficult to capture.  Third, while the overall market dynamics 
are captured by the model, phenomenon such as phase jumps remain to be explained.  
 
                                                          
11 Hirota (1981, 2004) and Mukherji (2002, pp.86-90; 2003) both demonstrate that the existence of 
instability in a broad class of models is very sensitive to the initial endowments.  Slight changes in initial 
endowments can produce a stable equilibrium.  Such results are relevant because the new allocations that 
occur due to disequilibrium trades can be analyzed as a different initial endowment and thus the theory 
suggests that along the path of disequilibrium trades a new, stable equilibrium would be found through the 
disequilibrium trades.  While this issue is beyond the scope of this paper we did solve for the equilibrium 
given every allocation that evolved during experiments.  The result is that relatively few of these equilibria 
are stable.  Of course, if the nature of the equilibrium changes with disequilibrium trades, the empirical 
property of Result 7 might not be reliable.   
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From a more general perspective, the results suggest that convergence to an interior 
equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.  The laws of dynamics can produce closed cycles and 
exploding orbits.  Such phenomenon are not simply a theoretical fiction.  The actual 
existence of these phenomena are verified by experiments.  Of course, the theory itself 
can be used to determine the likelihood in field environments.  Furthermore, partial 
equilibrium analysis can be used to measure speeds of adjustment and the percentage 
change in price can be used to forecast future movements of the system. Finally, the 
tatonnement model has remarkable predictive power in this non-tatonnement world.  Our 
analysis suggests that the reason is because not much difference exists between the 
excess demands of the two models.  Whether that is a robust result awaits additional 
experiments.  
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APPENDIX A:  Notes on Experimental Design and Parameters 
 
The parameters chosen for the experiments reflected considerable research on the various 
possibilities.  This appendix provides an overview that attempts to help the reader 
understand the parameters used and provides those interested with suggestions about 
additional experiments and tests. 
 
Four parameters are used to form preferences and initial endowments across the 
experimental series.  These parameters {α, β,γ, q} interacted with preferences and 
endowments.  The interactions with preferences are as follows.  Notice that α is a scaling 
parameter for x2, β is a scaling parameter for x3 and γ is a scaling parameter for x3.  The 
parameter q operates on individuals to change the value of different goods across the 
individuals.  The functions studied when in parametric form are: 
 
U1 (x2, x3)  = min [x2/qα, x3/β] 
U2 (x1, x3)  = min [x1/γ, x3/qβ] 
U3 (x1, x2)  = min [x1/qγ, x2/α] 
 
The choice of experimental design also involves an interaction of the four parameters 
with initial endowments.  The following example illustrates the material that will be 
presented in the table in the next section.  The example is for the case of clockwise 
unstable parameters that were actually used in the experiments. 
 
q = 1/3 
(γ,α, β) = (20,40,800) 
preferences 
type one preferences:   min{3x2/40, x3/800} 
type two preferences:   min{x1/20, 3x3/800} 
type three preferences: min{3x1/20, x2/40} 
 
endowments 
type one endowments:   (x1,x2,x3) = ( 0, 0, β)  = (0,0,800) 
type two endowments:   (x1,x2,x3) = ( γ, 0, 0 )  = (20,0,0) 
type three endowments: (x1,x2,x3) = ( 0, α, 0)  = (0,40,0) 
 
The predictions for this set of parameters are 
(i) (P1,P2) = (β/γ,β/α) = (40,20) where Pi is the price of xi in terms of x3. 
(ii) Unstable time path moving in a clockwise direction 
 
Table A1 provides a pattern of parameters that created a background for the specific 
choice of parameters for implementation.  Parameters that theoretically lead to closed 
cycles and to stable paths have been studied by Anderson, et. al., (2003) and by Plott 
(2001).  While existing studies did not use the parameters in the table, the parameters 
used in those studies did lead to the same qualitative implications for system behavior as 
the parameters in the table.  Thus, we make no attempt here, to study parameters that 
theoretically lead to stability or theoretically lead to closed cycles.  The question posed 
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here is whether or not divergence can be observed so the focus was on parameters that 
theoretically lead to divergence.  Those parameters are in the upper left and lower right of 
the table.  As can be seen, the difference resides in the choice of q and the choice of 
initial endowments.  
 
Table A1: General Parameter Set for Stability Analysis 
Endowments 
(γ,α, β) = (20,40,800) 
 
q 
type one (x1,x2,x3) = ( 0, α,0)  
type two (x1,x2,x3) = ( 0, 0, β)  
type three (x1,x2,x3) = (γ, 0,0)  
type one (x1,x2,x3) = ( 0, 0,β)  
type two (x1,x2,x3) = (γ, 0, 0) 
type three (x1,x2,x3) = (0,α,0) 
   
q>1 
q = 3 for 
experiments 
unstable counter clockwise 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
stable 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
q=1 limit cycle 
counter clockwise 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
limit cycle 
clockwise 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
q<1 
q = 1/3 for 
experiments 
stable 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
unstable clockwise 
equilibrium prices (40,20) 
 
Table A2 contains the parameter set for the experiments conducted.  The information in 
this table is essentially the same as the information in Table 1 in the text.  It is included 
here for the convenience of readers who want to compare the parameters that were 
implemented to the more general possibilities. 
 
Table A2:  Preferences And Endowments 
 Type 
 i = 1,2,3 
Ui(xi,yi,zi) endowments 
ω1 = (xi,yi,zi) 
Remarks 
Clockwise: q=1/3, (γ,α, β) = (20,40,800); Equilibrium Px = β/γ, Py = β/α  
 1 min{3y/40,z/800} ω1=(0,0,800) 
 2 min{x/20,3z/800} ω2=(20,0,0) 
 3 min{3x/20,y/40} ω3=(0,40,0) 
The classical model 
predicts divergence 
with tendencies in a 
clockwise direction. 
Counter Clockwise: q = 3, (γ,α , β) = (20,40,800) 
 1 min{y/120,z/800} ω1=(0,40,0) 
 2 min{x/20,z/2400} ω2=(0,0,800) 
 3 min{x/60,y/40} ω3=(20,0,0) 
The classical model 
predicts divergence 
with tendencies in a 
counter clockwise 
direction. 
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APPENDIX B: Sensitivity of Price Changes to Price Levels 
 
To explore the possibility that the rates of price adjustment are sensitive to the level of 
prices, we examined several possibilities.  First, we examined whether price changes vary 
linearly in price.  Linear regressions were performed and the results are presented in 
Tables B1 and B2.   
Table B1: YXYXXXYXYXYYXXXXsessionX PbPbPPEaPPEaaP ++++=
•
),(),(  
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -2.19163 1.642725 -1.334 0.18482 
EX (P)  0.681776 0.264441 2.578 0.01121 
EY (P)  0.026619 0.112791 0.236 0.81385 
PX  0.028415 0.009914 2.866 0.00495 
PY  -0.003253 0.008774 -0.371 0.71152 
021211 2.011362 1.998584 1.006 0.31636 
030130 -0.205054 2.358881 -0.087 0.93088 
030428 -2.606954 3.568085 -0.731 0.4665 
030620 -2.20595 2.754135 -0.801 0.42482 
030717 1.985534 1.968964 1.008 0.31539 
Residual standard error: 5.683 on 114 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2155, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1536  
F-statistic:  3.48 on 9 and 114 DF, p-value: 0.0007877   
 
Table B2: YYYXYXYXYYYYXXYXsessionY PbPbPPEaPPEaaP ++++=
•
),(),(  
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.92964 1.136122 0.818 0.414918 
EX (P)  -0.584541 0.182889 -3.196 0.001802 
EY (P)  0.113297 0.078007 1.452 0.149138 
PX  -0.005932 0.006857 -0.865 0.388746 
PY  0.022292 0.006068 3.674 0.000366 
021211 -1.902095 1.382237 -1.376 0.171488 
030130 -0.684075 1.631421 -0.419 0.675777 
030428 5.214188 2.467717 2.113 0.036786 
030620 0.147808 1.904783 0.078 0.938284 
030717 -2.096539 1.361751 -1.54 0.126432 
Residual standard error: 3.93 on 114 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.3402, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2882  
F-statistic: 6.532 on 9 and 114 DF, p-value: 1.805e-07 
 
Notice that the price of X has a significant coefficient in the X market and that the price 
of Y has a significant coefficient in the Y market.  Such sensitivities suggested to us that 
prices need to be included in the model somehow.  For example, the A matrix might be of 
the form A(P).  Further analysis indicated that the dependence on P does not appear 
linear, and instead there is an interaction between excess demand and price.  A shingle-
plot of relationship of price change and excess demand shows this relationship (Figure 
B1 and B2). 
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Each panel of the shingle plot shows scatter plot of price change against excess demand 
at a particular range of price.  The prices are increasing from left to right, and bottom to 
top, in the panels.  This plot clearly shows that the relationship of price change with 
excess demand changes across the range of prices.  In particular, prices changes appear to 
respond greater to excess demand at higher price levels.  
 
 
 
Figure B1: Shingle plot of price changes on excess demand in market X, conditional 
on intervals of X prices.  Notice the clear interaction between slope of excess 
demand and with price levels. 
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Figure B2:  Shingle plot of price changes on excess demand in market Y, conditional 
on intervals of Y prices.  Notice the clear interaction between slope of excess 
demand and with price levels. 
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APPENDIX C: 
The Newton Model 
 
Recall the Newton model fit poorly to the data.  Here we provide intuition behind this 
result.  In particular, the equilibrium is locally stable under the Newton method.  More 
generally, the Scarf environment is stable under the Newton method in the price space 
typically traversed in these experiments.  Figure C1 shows simulations of the Newton 
model under various starting points. 
 
 
Figure C1: Simulation of price dynamics under Newton model with starting points   
(5, 80), (5,5), (100, 60), (36, 12), (30,2). 
 
 
We explore why the Newton models fit the data so poorly. The basic reason is that the 
Newton Models predict convergence when the data demonstrate divergence.  
 
The differential equation of the Newton model is defined as  
,
)(
)(
)(1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
•
•
PE
PE
PJ
P
P
Y
X
Y
X  
In the above J(P) = J11 J12
J21 J22
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ =
∂EX (P)
∂PX
∂EX (P)
∂PY∂EY (P)
∂PX
∂EY (P)
∂PY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ ⎟ 
is the Jacobian of the excess 
demand functions.  
 
 
For the clockwise condition, the Jacobian matrix is:  
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Evaluating J(P) = 0  separates the price space into stable and unstable portions as shown 
in Figure C2. 
 
 
Figure C2 
 
For any initial position for stable portion, the Newton differential equations system 
converges to the equilibrium price.   
 
 
For the Counterclockwise condition, the Jacobian matrix is:  
 
20 − 40
(120 + PX )2
− 9PX
(3PX + 2PY )2
+ 3
3PX + 2PY
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ −
120PX
(3PX + 2PY )2
80PY
3PX + 2PY( )2 40 −
2PX
(3PX + 2PY )2
+ 60
(20 + 3PY )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
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Evaluating J(P) = 0, the stable and unstable portions are shown in Figure C3. 
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Figure C3 
 
Recall that initial prices for all but the first experiment were near (25,25), which is in the 
stable portion for both conditions.  This fact explains why the Newton model fit so 
poorly.  The Newton model predicts that movement should be toward the interior 
equilibrium but the data diverge.  Thus, the dynamics of the data and price movements 
cannot be represented by the Newton model of price adjustment.   
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APPENDIX D: Individual session estimates 
 
 Classical model 
 
Table D1: X equation  
Condition Session Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) R^2 F-stat 
Clockwise 021127 (Intercept) -2.847 2.768 -1.028 0.319 0.380 4.894 
  EMX 1.599 1.194 1.339 0.199   
  EMY -0.241 0.264 -0.914 0.374   
Clockwise 021211 (Intercept) 1.260 0.960 1.312 0.199 0.110 1.968 
  EMX 0.960 0.530 1.812 0.079   
  EMY -0.010 0.165 -0.060 0.953   
Clockwise 030717 (Intercept) 1.511 0.713 2.120 0.042 0.186 3.545 
  EMX 0.612 0.392 1.559 0.129   
  EMY -0.087 0.189 -0.463 0.646   
Counterclockwise 030130 (Intercept) 0.204 0.956 0.214 0.834 0.362 3.980 
  EMX 0.613 0.232 2.647 0.019   
  EMY 0.071 0.292 0.244 0.810   
Counterclockwise 030428 (Intercept) 3.685 4.901 0.752 0.474 0.200 0.998 
  EMX 2.494 3.543 0.704 0.501   
  EMY -0.309 1.006 -0.307 0.767   
Counterclockwise 030620 (Intercept) -4.740 3.560 -1.332 0.240 0.384 1.560 
  EMX 3.864 2.268 1.704 0.149   
  EMY 0.898 0.840 1.069 0.334   
 
Table D2: Y equation 
Condition Session Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) R^2 F-stat 
Clockwise 021127 (Intercept) 1.478 1.163 1.271 0.222 0.134 1.236 
  EMX -0.788 0.502 -1.572 0.136   
  EMY 0.173 0.111 1.562 0.138   
Clockwise 021211 (Intercept) 0.846 0.967 0.875 0.388 0.113 2.041 
  EMX -0.368 0.533 -0.690 0.495   
  EMY 0.248 0.166 1.495 0.145   
Clockwise 030717 (Intercept) 0.119 0.424 0.281 0.781 0.216 4.270 
  EMX -0.247 0.233 -1.061 0.297   
  EMY 0.136 0.112 1.215 0.233   
Counterclockwise 030130 (Intercept) 0.212 0.709 0.300 0.769 0.407 4.802 
  EMX -0.217 0.172 -1.261 0.228   
  EMY 0.438 0.216 2.024 0.062   
Counterclockwise 030428 (Intercept) 6.247 2.394 2.610 0.031 0.539 4.680 
  EMX -4.050 1.730 -2.340 0.047   
  EMY -0.195 0.491 -0.397 0.702   
Counterclockwise 030620 (Intercept) 1.396 0.393 3.551 0.016 0.650 4.644 
  EMX -0.669 0.250 -2.670 0.044   
  EMY -0.114 0.093 -1.227 0.274   
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Price-Scaled model 
Table D3: X equation 
Condition Session Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error t value Pr(>|t|) R^2 F-stat 
Clockwise 021127 (Intercept) -2.060 1.432 -1.439 0.170 0.374 4.781 
  Px:EMX 0.017 0.008 2.024 0.060   
  Px:EMY -0.002 0.002 -1.219 0.241   
Clockwise 021211 (Intercept) -0.055 1.128 -0.049 0.961 0.391 10.270 
  Px:EMX 0.017 0.004 4.531 0.000   
  Px:EMY 0.001 0.000 1.267 0.214   
Clockwise 030717 (Intercept) 0.926 1.128 0.821 0.418 0.100 1.717 
  Px:EMX 0.008 0.005 1.575 0.125   
  Px:EMY 0.000 0.001 0.336 0.739   
Counterclock
wise 030130 (Intercept) -0.454 1.038 -0.438 0.668 0.356 3.864 
  Px:EMX 0.008 0.003 2.778 0.015   
  Px:EMY 0.002 0.002 1.093 0.293   
Counterclock
wise 030428 (Intercept) 6.343 5.007 1.267 0.241 0.395 2.607 
  Px:EMX 0.013 0.017 0.769 0.464   
  Px:EMY -0.003 0.003 -0.913 0.388   
Counterclock
wise 030620 (Intercept) -4.691 4.325 -1.085 0.328 0.285 0.998 
  Px:EMX 0.028 0.020 1.413 0.217   
  Px:EMY 0.008 0.009 0.952 0.385   
Table D4: Y equation 
Condition Session Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) R^2 F-stat 
Clockwise 021127 (Intercept) 0.104 0.387 0.269 0.791 0.088 0.772 
  Py:EMX 0.000 0.004 -0.071 0.944   
  Py:EMY 0.005 0.004 1.237 0.234   
Clockwise 021211 (Intercept) -0.334 0.972 -0.344 0.733 0.338 8.160 
  Py:EMX -0.001 0.003 -0.512 0.612   
  Py:EMY 0.012 0.003 3.944 0.000   
Clockwise 030717 (Intercept) -0.052 0.453 -0.115 0.909 0.257 5.352 
  Py:EMX -0.002 0.002 -1.036 0.308   
  Py:EMY 0.004 0.002 2.446 0.020   
Counterclockwise 030130 (Intercept) 0.106 0.650 0.163 0.873 0.433 5.356 
  Py:EMX 0.001 0.002 0.300 0.769   
  Py:EMY 0.008 0.003 2.693 0.017   
Counterclockwise 030428 (Intercept) 0.675 2.500 0.270 0.794 0.650 7.419 
  Py:EMX -0.016 0.014 -1.099 0.304   
  Py:EMY 0.015 0.008 1.849 0.102   
Counterclockwise 030620 (Intercept) 0.845 0.390 2.166 0.083 0.676 5.223 
  Py:EMX -0.016 0.007 -2.225 0.077   
  Py:EMY -0.003 0.004 -0.811 0.454   
-45- 
Mixed Effects Models 
 
As was stated in the paper, mixed effects models were also estimated for the various 
models.  Mixed effects models allow us to better capture the panel-nature of the 
experimental data.  In particular, by using mixed effects models, we are able to relax the 
assumption of a common adjustment matrix for all sessions, which we imposed in the 
OLS regressions presented in the paper.  
 
The random-effects model treats the variation of the adjustment matrix between sessions 
as random variation around a population mean.   
 
Denote each session by s, where s ∈ (1,2,...,S) , S = 6; and trade t in each session 
t ∈ (1,2,...,Ts). 
 
We define 
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Intuitively, we separate the effects into two levels.  The coefficient a represents the true 
effect of price scaled excess demand on prices changes.  The random variable as is the 
variance around a between the sessions.  This model and variations of the model were 
estimated using the nlme package in R (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000).   
 
Here we report the estimates for the X equation of the price scaled model.  The estimates 
of the fixed effects a are 
 
 Value Std.Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.4331188 0.5237794 0.826911 0.41 
PX EX (P)  0.0129623 0.0028452 4.555891 0 
PX EY (P)  0.0002188 0.0006488 0.337245 0.7365 
 
Compared to the estimates in OLS in Table 8A, where the coefficient on PX EX (P)= 
0.0148 (s.e. = 0.00286), PX EY (P)  = -0.000533 (s.e. = 0.000557), the estimates in the 
mixed effects model are very similar. 
 
The standard deviation given by the random effects variance-covariance matrix, Ψs, is 
0.00317 for PX EX (P) , and 0.000731 for PX EY (P) .  Note that the standard deviation of 
the significant term PX EX (P)  is less than 1/4 of the estimated coefficient.  This supports 
the choice of a fixed effects model, as appears to be little variation around the mean 
between sessions.   
 
For completeness, we reproduce the mixed effects estimates for the Y equation of the 
price scaled model. 
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 Value Std.Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.014664218 0.3608543 0.040637 0.9677 
PY EX (P)  -0.001883857 0.0015816 -1.191144 0.236 
PY EY (P)  0.00926924 0.0029225 3.171642 0.0019 
 
As is clear, these estimates are very close to these presented in the OLS model in Table 
8B. 
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